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Abstract
Discount rate changes always receive considerable attention in financial markets. Two
hypotheses compete to explain financial market reactions: the direct ‘borrowing cost effect’ and
the announcement effect. This paper examines the issue for the Bundesbank’s discount rate
changes after 1979. Summing up we find that market reactions cannot be attributed to a direct
borrowing cost effect but exclusively to announcement effects. The empirical results indicate that
interest rates react to changes in the discount rate to the extent that they are unanticipated. In
contrast, the response to anticipated changes in the discount rate is small and insignificant. We
proxy market anticipations by a multinomial logit-model combined with a dummy variable
capturing non-quantifiable factors reported by the financial press. Moreover, we show that the
response of interest rates declines along the term structure and with the switch to greater
emphasis on repurchase operations in early 1985.
JEL-Classification: E43, E52
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1 Introduction
Financial market participants pay a considerable amount of attention  to
announcements of discount rate changes. Among economists, however, a
continuing controversy is going on about why and to what extent financial markets
respond to such announcements. There are two major strands of thought. A first,
more traditional approach holds that any change of the discount rate has a ‘direct
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effect’ on financial markets as it changes the cost of borrowing at the discount
window. If discount window borrowing is sensitive to the spread between the
short-term interest rate and the discount rate, a change in the latter will directly
affect borrowing, therefore, the supply of base money and interest rates.
Obviously, the empirical relevance of the direct effect is contingent upon the
degree of interest sensitivity of discount window borrowing as well as the relative
size of this source of base money creation. Studies for the US suggest that the
direct effect is negligible if it exists at all, see, e.g., Thornton (1994).
A competing explanation of why financial markets may immediately respond to
changes of the discount rate concentrates on information or announcement effects.
If financial market participants perceive discount rate changes as signalling a switch
in the future stance of monetary policy, they may alter expectations about future
economic conditions and thus affect the demand for credit. An alternative view,
suggested by Friedman (1959), assumes that the central bank possesses private
information on the course of economic activity and may use discount rate changes
to signal its predictions. For the information effect to work, markets must regard
discount rate changes as conveying new and useful information. Once this line of
thought is accepted, it follows that the effects of discount rate changes on market
interest rates may vary considerably from announcement to announcement
depending on their information content and on the degree to which they were
anticipated or not.
The first systematic empirical study of market reactions to changes in the
discount rate goes back to Waud (1970). He finds that discount rate changes
negatively affect equity values. Lombra and Torto (1977) extend Waud’s analysis
by accounting for the possible endogeneity of the discount rate. Despite them
finding the discount rate to be endogenous in the post-1967 period, they observe a
significant market reaction.
Starting with Thornton (1982), the empirical literature (e.g. Smirlock and
Yawitz 1985, Cook and Hahn 1988, Dueker 1992, and May 1992) has made a
conceptual distinction between technical and non-technical changes of the
discount rate. A technical change carries no information about the stance of3
monetary policy or the economy. It just serves to realign the discount rate with
money market rates. Non-technical changes of the discount rate, in contrast,
concur with a change in the policy stance, and hence those discount rate
movements carry relevant information. Thus, theoretically, technical changes are
passive adjustments that should be predictable while non-technical changes, at least
to some extent, result from pure discretion that cannot be anticipated. Yet the
empirical evidence produced by Roley and Troll (1984), Hakkio and Pearce (1986,
1992), Dueker (1992), and Thornton (1994) suggests that both types of discount
rate changes are equally (un-)predictable. This may be due to the fact that it is
difficult to differentiate technical from non-technical changes of the discount rate at
the empirical level. In the literature, the distinction is based on the wording of the
Federal Reserve Board’s press releases where as a rule the reasons for discount
rate changes are explicitly stated. As Smirlock and Yawitz (1985) note one should
be aware that this method of classifying discount rate changes “[...] implicitly
assumes that the reasons given by the Fed are accurate, or at least that the market
perceives that they are accurate.”
The general hypothesis that financial markets react to non-technical changes is
well supported by the evidence (see e.g. Roley and Troll 1984, Smirlock and
Yawitz 1985, and Cook and Hahn 1988). This confirms that non-technical changes
of the discount rate are considered as relevant carriers of information though the
nature of this information remains in the dark. A systematic link between discount
rate changes and future changes in monetary policy has not been found yet.
Thornton (1994), for example, empirically rejects the notion that non-technical
discount rate changes signal a change in the stance of monetary policy.
The existing empirical literature exclusively deals with the discount rate policy
of the Federal Reserve. The question is whether financial markets in other
countries react similarly. This paper investigates the discount rate policy of the
German Bundesbank. This may be of particular interest given that the Bundesbank
is an important international player.
At the outset, note that as a rule the Bundesbank does not explain the exact
reasons that have led to the decision of a discount rate change. Therefore, there is4
no direct way to differentiate technical from non-technical changes. In all
likelihood most changes are technical in nature. We argue that there is no need for
the Bundesbank to use the discount rate neither as a signalling device nor to exert a
direct influence on money market rates. There are several observations supporting
this conjecture: first, the dominant component of the Bundesbank’s lending to
commercial banks is effected by open market transactions with repurchase
agreements while rediscount credit has become much less important a source of
base money creation during the 1980s. Second, the Bundesbank sets the discount
rate below the market clearing level and rations the borrowing at the discount
window by rediscount quotas that almost always are fully used up. Third, the
discount rate is changed infrequently while the money market rate can be
controlled quasi continuously by changing non-borrowed reserves as well as by the
auctioning of repurchase agreements at changed repo rates.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: In the next section we
examine if discount rate changes directly affect borrowing at the discount window.
In section 3 and 4, we investigate the announcement effect. As a first step we need
to determine whether discount rate changes contain new information. This is done
in section 3 where we study the predictability of discount rate changes using a
multinomial logit model. This permits predicting the direction and timing though
not the magnitude of a change in the discount rate. In extension of the existing
literature, we also incorporate the information contained in the financial press by
scrutinising the German daily Handelsblatt several days before each Bundesbank
board’s meeting. Proceeding in this way allows us to capture non-quantifiable
factors, e.g. official statements, presumably affecting market participants’
expectations. Then, in section 4, the predictions and the information collected from
the press are used for studying the reaction of money market rates to the
anticipated and non-anticipated components of discount rate changes. Finally,
section 5 gives some conclusions.7
the direct effect: While the overnight rate reacts significantly to discount rate
changes in the pre-unification period, the market reaction is insignificant in the
more interest sensitive post-unification period. Therefore, we conclude that, as in
the U.S., the direct effect is not a relevant phenomenon in Germany.
<Table 3 about here>
3 Are discount rate changes anticipated?
Investigating the potential announcement effect of discount rate changes
requires first to determine whether and to which extent those policy actions were
anticipated by market participants, because only the unanticipated component
represents new information that affects asset prices on the spot if markets are
informationally efficient.
There are essentially two statistical methods available for splitting discount rate
changes into anticipated and non-anticipated components. A first method, applied
by Smirlock and Yawitz (1985), is to regress the discount rate changes on
explanatory variables and to equate the unanticipated component with the error
term of the empirical model. However, this approach suffers from the shortcoming
that the estimated predictions do not comply with the fact that discount rate
changes are limited to discrete steps of 25, 50, 75, and 100 basis points. A
preferable, second method is estimating a logit (or probit) model. This permits
taking explicitly the discrete nature of actual discount rate changes into account.
 In this study we rely on the second method, as our main concern is whether and
in which direction the Bundesbank changes its discount rate while the numerical
size of a change is of less importance here. Anyway, the bulk of German discount
rate changes is of uniform size, i.e. 50 basis points. This underlines the
appropriateness of a logit model. Consequently, in our empirical application we
estimate a three-choice situation (discount rate increase, decrease, or no change).
The statistical model is a multinomial logit of the form:
  (3)9
significantly increases the probability of a positive discount rate change. Finally, if
the overnight rate declines towards the discount rate, that is the spread narrows,
the probability of a discount rate cut, that serves to keep the discount rate in line
with market interest rates, rises significantly.
To check the robustness of these results to alternative specifications and to
investigate further the reaction function of the Bundesbank, we include some
supplementary variables in the analysis and test their significance. The first factor
we study are interest smoothing motives. In a study of the interest rate targeting
behavior of the Federal Reserve, Rudebusch (1995) finds that target changes are
guided by interest rate smoothing motives. This implies that policy actions are
spread over time and targets are adjusted only gradually. Statistically, interest rate
smoothing behavior leads to serial correlation in discount rate changes and can be
tested by the inclusion of a dummy variable being set to one if a discount rate
change occurred in the last n months.
Given the distribution of time lags between discount rate changes of same sign,
we let n vary from one to four. In all cases was the sign of this dummy variable
negative rejecting interest smoothing motives. The negative sign rather indicates
that the Bundesbank abstains from changing the discount rate too often, i.e. within
short time intervals; presumably because too frequent a use of this signaling device
risks to lessen its effect. Since the dummy variable is significant at the five percent
significance level in only one of eight cases (n=2, increase), we decide against
including it in the empirical model.
Moreover, we study the explanatory power of two additional variables. First, to
capture potential reactions of the Bundesbank to tensions in the European
Monetary System (EMS) we test the explanatory power of the deutsche mark-
French franc exchange rate. Second, to see whether discount rate policy takes
unemployment into account, in addition to the growth rate of production, we also
add the unemployment rate (and changes in it) to the set of explanatory variables.
All these variables are not found to exert a significant influence, signifying that the
                                                                                                                                
higher frequency data for most explanatory variables and (ii) the exact timing of a discount rate10
Bundesbank does not appear to react systematically to external and internal
pressures by changing its discount rate. Since the remaining results prove robust to
the inclusion of these variables they were omitted from subsequent analysis.
<Figures 1a and 1b about here>
Figures 1a and 1b depict the estimated probabilities of a discount rate increase
or decrease. The predicted prior probabilities often peak in or close to the months
when discount rate changes (indicated by bars) took place. However they rarely
top 50 percent except in the post-unification period. For this most recent period
the model predicts quite accurately the 1993 discount rate cuts. But note that the
model also generates some few ‘false signals,’ i.e. relatively high estimated
probabilities when no discount rate change actually occurred. Yet these ‘false
signals’ generally show up close to months when the discount rate was changed in
the same direction. This illustrates the fact that the exact timing of discretionary
policy decisions is hard to predict anyway – which could also be due to the fact
that supposedly the Bundesbank randomises its responses to some extent – even
though they are not completely unanticipated by market participants.
Overall our findings are in conformity with the results of studies on US discount
rate changes, e.g. Hakkio and Pearce (1986, 1992) and Dueker (1992). The
explanatory power of such empirical models is low and the estimates do not permit
to predict reliably the exact timing of discount rate changes.
To this point, we have not used the information contained in the financial press
to ameliorate our model’s predictions. The exploration of this source of
information allows us to capture non-quantifiable factors such as statements by
Bundesbank officials. In order to evaluate the press’s assessment of the likelihood
of a discount rate change, we checked the economic daily Handelsblatt three days
preceding the Bundesbank’s central bank council meetings, i.e. Monday through
Wednesday, for reports on expected discount rate decisions. A dummy variable
serves to capture the Handelsblatt’s predictions. It takes the value 1 if a discount
                                                                                                                                
change is arduous to predict anyway.11
rate change was predicted and zero otherwise. Altogether, 15 discount rate
changes out of 37 were coded as anticipated by the financial press.
This raises another question. Are the ‘newspaper anticipations’ related to the
predictions of our logit model or do they carry independent, complementary
information, extracted from statements by Bundesbank officials or market moods?
Even so it is conceivable that the policy evaluations of those sources resulted from
the same set of variables we have used above in estimating the prior probabilities of
discount rate changes. Table 5 presents the discount rate changes, the estimated
probabilities and the newspaper anticipation dummy variable. A casual inspection
of the data suggests that high estimated probabilities of our logit-model are not
linked to the newspaper anticipations. This presumption was formally corroborated
by a statistical test. To this aim we regressed our prior probability on newspaper
anticipations in a logit model. The null hypothesis of no influence was not
rejected.
4 The result permits us to treat the newspaper anticipations and our
estimated probabilities as complementary sources of information about oncoming
changes of the discount rate.
<Table 5 about here>
4 Discount rate changes and market rates
In this section we investigate the hypothesis that changes of the discount rate
convey new and useful information to financial markets about a change in the
stance of monetary policy and, therefore, affect market interest rates. To create a
benchmark case, we begin by testing the counter-hypothesis that the information
content in German discount rate changes is zero and that in addition discount rate
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The second subcomponent is the expected size of a discount rate change
denoted by S. We follow the straightforward assumption of the literature that
market participants always anticipate the correct magnitude of a change in the
discount rate; see e.g. Hakkio and Pearce (1986). Thus we set S DR = D . This, of
course, is not literally true. As an alternative one might assume, for example, that
the market has constant expectations regarding the size of a discount rate change
equal to the median of all changes in our sample, i.e. 50 basis points. But note that
this alternative assumption does not yield substantially different empirical results.
As already discussed above, the switch towards a more flexible money market
control as well as GMU constitute potential structural breaks that should be tested
for. Thus before moving on with the examination of market reactions to discount
rate changes, we study the structural stability of equation (2) with a Chow-test.
The results are reported in Table 6. The null of structural stability is
overwhelmingly rejecting if February 1985 is taken as sample split date. In
contrast, GMU does not seem to have influenced market reactions to discount rate
changes. In view of these results, we proceed with two sub-periods: The first
spanning the period from January 1979 to January 1985, the second covering the
time from February 1985 to December 1996. Note however, that due to few
observations in sub-period 1 these period’s results should be interpreted with
caution.
Table 7 reports the estimates of equations (2) and (4) for the two sub-periods
and different maturities. The results can be summarised as follows: Market
reactions to changes in the discount rate decrease considerably along the term
structure. According to the emphasis on repurchase operations in sub-period 2, a
comparison between the two sub-periods reveals a more pronounced interest rate
reaction in sub-period 1. The reaction to the anticipated component of changes in
the discount rate is never significant and typically many times smaller than that to
the unexpected component. Apart from one exception the coefficient of the
unexpected component is always significant at the 5 or 1% significance level. To
formally test the hypothesis that the market reacts differently to anticipated and
non-anticipated discount rate changes, we compute an F-test of coefficient14
equality. For sub-period 1 we cannot reject the null of an equal response, whereas
for sub-period 2 it is clearly rejected. Furthermore, the adjusted R² is generally
higher when the distinction between anticipated and non-anticipated discount rate
changes is made. This also indicates that the separation contains some additional
information. A comparison with the studies on U.S. discount rates shows that
market reactions in Germany and the U.S. are qualitatively similar, especially
regarding the differences between the reaction to anticipated and non-anticipated
changes in the discount rate.
<Table 7 about here>
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the response of German money market rates to
changes in the Bundesbank’s discount rate. Similar to results found for U.S. data,
the response cannot be attributed to a direct ‘borrowing cost effect’ but to the
existence of announcements effects. Our results suggest that changes in the
German discount rate are unexpected to a considerable extent and the unexpected
component translates into simultaneous changes of the money market rate. The
size of the market reaction declines along the term structure. With the switch to
flexible money market control in early 1985 – when repurchase operations took
over the role as dominant money market instrument – market reaction was
reduced. Notwithstanding, changes in the discount rate still have a significant
announcement effect despite the availability of more flexible signalling devices such
as changes in repo rates or public announcements.
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Appendix: Data sources
The monthly data for rediscount borrowing and rediscount quotas are from the
Bundesbank’s Monthly Reports. All other monthly data used throughout this paper
are taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Interest rates and
exchange rates are monthly averages. The daily observations of the money market
rates used in section 4 are Frankfurt Interbank rates and have been gathered by the
Deutsche Bundesbank before noon of the corresponding day.16
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Notes: To safe space the constant is not reported. F-Test is a F-distributed test of
the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the expected and unexpected
component are equal. Maturities up to 1 year are taken from the Frankfurt
Interbank market (gathered by the Deutsche Bundesbank before 12:00 noon).
Data on 12 months were not available for the first sub-period. All data were
provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. t-statistics in parenthesis. **, *, and †
means that the null can be rejected at a risk of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.21









Figure 1a. Estimated probability of a discount rate increase









Figure 1b. Estimated probability of a discount rate decrease